Comprehending the Foreign of China

[This was published on 05 October 2014 in Burma Times]

Mr. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China and Secretary General of CPC, appears to be more forward-looking, visionary, enterprising, inquisitive, pragmatic, accommodative and responsive having an initiative bent of mind within the wrinkle of arts, science and technology to move with time, space and dimension. Aware of realities, possibilities, long-term or short-term, of the overall standing of China in today’s overall landscapes encompassing politics, economics, defence, strategic or otherwise, and so forth in the world in general and Asia in particular, he is steadfast and hardnosed enough to go even beyond time. Flexibilities, weaknesses, limitations—inherent or not--- residing in plans and strategies are at this time well detected and noted more virtually and mathematically than ever before. While Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy dictum was for China to “hide its strength and bide its time” (taoguang yanghui),-- Deng’s low-key approach to foreign affairs--in January 2014 Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping announced that China should be “proactive” (fenfa you wei). This is the equivalent of China moving from first gear into second; and like second gear, the pace of this new foreign policy can sometimes be jagged.

That’s why, there has started a departure from the past ‘Policy of less engagement’ to/for ‘Policy of more engagement’ in multi-dimensional perspectives under the circumstances, approving or not, that takes notes of the events in and around the world at large. It is believed by the Chinese people that China carries five thousand years of glorious past but America with Manifest doctrine and India with India doctrine are pointedly latecomers in this hemisphere while Japan is yet to be an Asian power taking all necessary factors together. This is, as if, an era of the soaring of China with her politics and diplomacy anointed with befitting vision and mission backed by the doctrines notably earmarked as ‘Silk Road, String of Pearls and China Dream’

To suit the very purposes, Xi Jinping, unlike his predecessors, is shuttling  from one corner to another on earth making others understand and realize that ‘friend in need means China, partner reliable indeed denotes China and, above all, peace and marching forward entail China’. Thus, first of all, unavoidably comes to the forefront the asking what is China and how does it work at home and interact with others bi-laterally, regionally and/or internationally? All these are mostly available to and rooted in the foreign policy of a state of which China is not definitely an exception at all. Hence, the call is for comprehending the foreign policy of China.  In fact, this very article is a kind of amplification of my write-ups ‘Understanding the Foreign Policy of China’, Dhaka Courier and African Herald Express, 7 August  2014, ‘Peeping into the Foreign Policy of China’, Daily Observer, 5 September 2014.

Truly speaking, China on all counts is up-and-coming super power and, realistically enough, she has by this time attained the maturity of becoming the number-1 economic super power. Therefore, its foreign policy as a whole is also a marked subject and concern at large for the world, present and future. Interestingly enough, in the vein of most other nations, Chinese foreign policy is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is, unlike other states, uniquely subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Communist Party of China. There is also a separate body of Chinese strategic thought and theory of international relations, which is distinct from Western theory. Interlocutors and think tanks are very important here. Much of Chinese foreign policy discussion takes place between interlocutors who form such think-tanks. An interlocutor is someone who off the record explains the views of a government and also can relay messages back to a government. Unlike a spokesperson, an interlocutor often has no formal position within a government or any formal authority to speak on its behalf, and even when they do, everything an interlocutor says is his own personal opinion and not the official view of anyone. Communications between interlocutors are often useful at conveying information and ideas. Often interlocutors will talk with each other before formal negotiations. Interlocutors played an extremely important role in Sino-American relations in 1972.  This is really a variation from other member states of UN.

China, being a country of cosmic territory, has 14 neighboring nations by land and 7 neighbors by sea (8 if counting Taiwan). Only Russia has as many neighboring nations (14 by land, 12 by sea). Snce her birth in 1949, many disputes and confrontations have arisen and resolved and many yet are sitting on the fence. Of late, these issues have strategically and intentionally been capitalized and politicized by United States as part of its China containment policy and East Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration. Further realization owes its genesis to China-India Relations, China-Japan Relations and China-Russia Relations in the milieu of US-India Relations, US-Japan Relations and US-Russia Relations in particular. Due consideration and assessment should as well be accorded to China’s relations with the Muslim countries in the Asian political landscapes.

China asserts that its decisions on foreign policy questions derive from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese leadership originally enumerated these principles in 1954 when China, with a communist government, was trying to reach out to the non-communist countries of Asia.

Today, the Five Principles still hand round a useful purpose. They offer an alternative to the American conception of a new kind of world order — one in which international regimes and institutions, often reflecting U.S. interests and values, limit the rights of sovereign states to develop and sell weapons of mass destruction, repress opposition and violate human rights, pursue mercantilist economic policies that interfere with free trade, and damage the environment. China's alternative blueprint for the world stresses the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all states large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not. Another Chinese term for such a system is "multipolarity." The Five Principles put in plain words why America should not be able to impose its values on weaker nations. Thus the core idea behind the Five Principles as interpreted by China today is sovereignty – that one state has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state.

China’s use of the terms like five principles of peaceful co-existence , New Security Concept, Peaceful Rise/ Peaceful Development,  Period of Strategic Opportunity” and “Harmonious World” all are intelligible manifestations and  indications of her march  towards future in tune with time, space and dimension. China’s perception of ‘String of Pearls’ is now a fact. Let the world see what actually China gives birth to in the end.

The theme of foreign policy in a state rotates around the avowed principle of ‘change and continuity’. When a state is in a realistically and ideologically comfortable standing to keep and uphold balance and harmony in this regard it then starts becoming a model for others. Unlike USA and other European countries, here China is radiantly more promising and inspiring. In 2007, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about the eight-point diplomatic philosophy of China:

1. China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony.
2. China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries' internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries.
3. China maintains all countries, big or small, should be treated equally and respect each other. All affairs should be consulted and resolved by all countries on the basis of equal participation. No country should bully others on the basis of strength.
4. China will make judgment on each case in international affairs, each matter on the merit of the matter itself and it will not have double standards. China will not have two policies: one for itself and one for others. China believes that it cannot do unto others what they do not wish others do unto them.
5. China advocates that all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter and norms governing international relations. China advocates stepping up international cooperation and is against unilateral politics. China should not undermine the dignity and the authority of the U.N. China should not impose and set its own wishes above the U.N. Charter, international law and norms.
6. China advocates peaceful negotiation and consultation so as to resolve its international disputes. China does not resort to force, or threat of force, in resolving international disputes. China maintains a reasonable national military buildup to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not made to expand, nor does it seek invasion or aggression.
7. China is firmly opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China is a responsible member of the international community, and as for international treaties, China abides by all them in a faithful way. China never plays by a double standard, selecting and discarding treaties it does not need.
8. China respects the diversity of civilization and the whole world. China advocates different cultures make exchanges, learn from each other, and complement one another with their own strengths. China is opposed to clashes and confrontations between civilizations, and China does not link any particular ethnic group or religion with terrorism.

In 2011, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi outlined plans for an "integrated approach" that would serve China's economic development. In recent years, China's leaders have been regular travelers to all parts of the globe, and it has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral organizations.

The United States Department of Defense in a 2011 report confirmed that China continues to use nationalism in order to increase support for the Communist party and to avoid internal criticism. However, this may also make it more difficult for Chinese foreign policy moderates to calm down tensions and avoid inflexibility during international conflicts.

                                                   

There is no way to fail to notice the absence of career diplomats and foreign affairs experts at the highest level of power in Beijing. China is rising as a global power, but the position that foreign policy occupies in the Chinese political system is very near to the ground. However, neither Mr. Yang, who will continue to oversee foreign relations, nor Mr. Wang Yi, the new foreign minister, is among the 25 members of the Politburo — the power center of Chinese politics.

None of the seven members of the even more powerful Politburo Standing Committee — which includes Mr. Xi and the new prime minister, Li Keqiang — is a foreign policy expert, though one of them, Wang Qishan, has worked closely with the last two Treasury secretaries of the United States, Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Timothy F. Geithner, in coordinating the response to the global economic crisis of 2007-8.

The Chinese leadership might be tempted to entertain its domestic base by adopting more nationalistic foreign policies. China has a lot of domestic troubles, from corruption to a slowing economy. However, the new leaders have to make sure that they fully understand the consequences of China’s heading down a path of nationalism. China is highly dependent on the global market, resources, investment and technology. A more nationalistic, hard-line route would inevitably cause more conflict and direct confrontation with China’s neighbors, even to the point of war. Such an outcome would severely set back China’s desire to assume a role it believes should be commensurate with its wealth and size. Critics affirm that under domestic compulsions, Chinese foreign policy shall remain within the fold of ‘reactive foreign policy’ for a long. Nevertheless, it is true, like other states, China foreign policy also believes in proactive, reactive and moderate approaches as and when required. Attention should as well be paid to the reality that under Xi’s leadership China has gone head to head with Japan on contested territory in the East China Sea, declared a new ADIZ over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and been increasingly assertive in the South China Sea.

Role of intelligence agencies is imperative in today’s foreign policy but here China remains almost indecipherable, although names of CIA (USA), RAW (India), MOSSAD (Israel), MI6 (UK), ISI (Pakistan), DGES (France), ASIS (Australia), BND (Germany) and so on are widely known for their successes and failures respectively. Contrary to popular belief, the KGB and GRU did not go away after the fall of USSR but simply morphed into ultimately three organizations under Putin: the SVR, FSB, and GRU.

For China such role (non military area of interests) is played by the Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China (MSS). It is responsible for counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence and political security. It is China's largest and most active state intelligence and headquartered near the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China in Beijing.

According to Liu Fuzhi, former Secretary-General of the Commission for Politics and Law under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Minister of Public Security, the mission of the MSS is to ensure "the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counter-revolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist system." One of the primary missions of the MSS is reportedly to gather foreign intelligence from targets in various countries overseas. Many MSS agents are said to have operated in the Greater China region (Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) and to have integrated themselves into the world's numerous overseas Chinese communities. At one point, nearly 120 agents who had been operating under non-official cover in the U.S., Canada, Western and Northern Europe, and Japan as businessmen, bankers, scholars, and journalists were recalled to China. It is said by many that the MSS’ days of remaining in dark are over since it has over the period of time made its standing visible in USA and Western Europe n various moods and modes. In the developing countries MSS activities are largely confined to industrial purposes (industrial espionage) and nowadays its ambits are increasing at the call of time, space and dimension. More China finds interests in the music of political dominance, more she finds logic to use and increase MSS network. Geng Huichang, sitting Minister of State Security of the People's Republic of China, and a former President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an influential think tank, is considered mathematically as a powerful watchdog in this regard.

For more than twenty years, China has operated under a foreign policy framework within which it has neither friends nor enemies. With a few exceptions, all other countries were essentially treated as the same with the maintenance of an external environment most conducive to China's own economic development the paramount priority. Such a position is no longer attainable. Through several recent speeches, Xi has articulated a different strategic direction. China's new foreign policy outlook indicates an approach known as Fen Fa You Wei (striving for achievement) to engage its neighboring countries and to over time align their interests with China's rise. Xi specifically stressed friendship and loyalty between China and its neighbors. This shift is more significant than it sounds. Under Xi, China embarks on treating friends and enemies differently. For those who are willing to play a constructive role in China's rise, China will seek ways for them to gain greater actual benefits from China's development.

China's going up is perhaps the most significant episode for the world since the sunup of the modern era. No one can predict with precision its long-term implications. The risk of military conflict no doubt exists. But at least for the next generation, sufficient strategic options exist for peace. And Xi Jinping's new foreign policy outlook, though seemingly more assertive, puts China on a path more conducive to peace.

 Notwithstanding anything told and emphasized about the foreign policy of China, be sure that remains there a big challenge for China’s diplomats, who are not represented at the highest echelons of power in Beijing, to make clear to the government how shortsighted and unwise a confrontational foreign policy strategy would be. China-India Relations, China-Japan Relations, China-EU Relations and China-USA Relations shall be the deciding factors for the politics and dominance in the 21^st century. what is more, will China be in an apt position to face the challenges of Washington’s ‘Rebalancing strategy’ aimed at the targeted bumping up of US’ attention to Asia since US is currently a hyper state, of course, with hyper moves and drives breeding and spreading, necessarily or unnecessarily, confusions, suspicions, misunderstandings, embarrassments and tensions in the allied and non-allied camps? Let the world see and welcome China to play her historic role in transforming the globe into an abode of peace, tranquility, development and harmony in the face of challenges, Himalayan or oceanic.